Criminal Law

Model Penal Code (selected provisions)

Published by the American Law Institute

SECTION 1.02. PURPOSES; PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION.

SECTION 1.07. METHOD OF PROSECUTION WHEN CONDUCT CONSTITUTES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.

SECTION 1.13. GENERAL DEFINITIONS.

SECTION 2.01. REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY ACT; OMISSION AS BASIS OF LIABILITY; POSSESSION AS AN ACT.

SECTION 2.02. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF CULPABILITY.

SECTION 2.03. CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONDUCT AND RESULT; DIVERGENCE BETWEEN RESULT DESIGNED OR CONTEMPLATED AND ACTUAL RESULT OR BETWEEN PROBABLE AND ACTUAL RESULT.

SECTION 2.05. WHEN CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS ARE INAPPLICABLE TO VIOLATIONS AND TO OFFENSES DEFINED BY OTHER STATUTES; EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY IN REDUCING GRADE OF OFFENSE TO VIOLATION.

SECTION 2.06. LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER; COMPLICITY.

SECTION 2.09. DURESS.

SECTION 3.02. JUSTIFICATION GENERALLY: CHOICE OF EVILS.

SECTION 3.03. EXECUTION OF PUBLIC DUTY.

SECTION 3.04. USE OF FORCE IN SELF–PROTECTION.

SECTION 3.07. USE OF FORCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT.

SECTION 3.09. MISTAKE OF LAW AS TO UNLAWFULNESS OF FORCE OR LEGALITY OF ARREST; RECKLESS OR NEGLIGENT USE OF OTHERWISE JUSTIFIABLE FORCE; RECKLESS OR NEGLIGENT INJURY OR RISK OF INJURY TO INNOCENT PERSONS.

SECTION 5.01. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT.

SECTION 5.02. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION.

SECTION 5.03. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.

SECTION 5.05. GRADING OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPT, SOLICITATION AND CONSPIRACY.

ARTICLE 210.  HOMICIDE.

SECTION 210.1. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE.

SECTION 210.2. MURDER.

SECTION 210.3. MANSLAUGHTER.

SECTION 210.4. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

ARTICLE 213. SEXUAL OFFENSES.

SECTION 213.1. RAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES.

SECTION 213.2. DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE BY FORCE OR IMPOSITION.

SECTION 213.3. CORRUPTION OF MINORS AND SEDUCTION.

SECTION 213.4. SEXUAL ASSAULT.

SECTION 213.5. INDECENT EXPOSURE.

SECTION 213.6. PROVISIONS GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO ARTICLE 213.

SECTION 242.3. HINDERING APPREHENSION OR PROSECUTION.

SECTION 250.2. DISORDERLY CONDUCT.


SECTION 1.02.  PURPOSES; PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION

(1) The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are:

(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests;

(b) to subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes;

(c)  to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal;

(d) to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense;

(e) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses.

(2) The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all official actors in the sentencing system, are:

(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders:

(i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders;

(ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, restoration of crime victims and communities, and reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding community, provided these goals are pursued within the boundaries of proportionality in subsection (a)(i); and

(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve the applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii);

(b) in matters affecting the administration of the sentencing system:

(i) to preserve judicial discretion to individualize sentences within a framework of law;

(ii) to produce sentences that are uniform in their reasoned pursuit of the purposes of subsection (a);

(iii) to eliminate inequities in sentencing across population groups;

(iv) to encourage the use of intermediate sanctions;

(v) to ensure that adequate resources are available for carrying out sentences imposed and that rational priorities are established for the use of those resources;

(vi) to ensure that all criminal sanctions are administered in a humane fashion and that incarcerated offenders are provided reasonable benefits of subsistence, personal safety, medical and mental-health care, and opportunities to rehabilitate themselves;

(vii) to promote research on sentencing policy and practices, including assessments of the effectiveness of criminal sanctions as measured against their purposes, and the effects of criminal sanctions upon families and communities; and

(viii) to increase the transparency of the sentencing and correction system, its accountability to the public, and the legitimacy of its operations as perceived by all affected communities.

(3) The provisions of the Code shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this Section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved. The discretionary powers conferred by the Code shall be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated in the Code and, insofar as such criteria are not decisive, to further the general purposes stated in this Section.

SECTION 1.07.  METHOD OF PROSECUTION WHEN CONDUCT CONSTITUTES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE

(1) Prosecution for Multiple Offenses; Limitation on Convictions. When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if:

(a) one offense is included in the other, as defined in Subsection (4) of this Section; or

(b) one offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit the other; or

(c) inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or

(d) the offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct; or

(e) the offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct and the defendant’s course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses.

(2) Limitation on Separate Trials for Multiple Offenses. Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.

(3) Authority of Court to Order Separate Trials. When a defendant is charged with two or more offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the Court, on application of the prosecuting attorney or of the defendant, may order any such charge to be tried separately, if it is satisfied that justice so requires.

(4) Conviction of Included Offense Permitted. A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment [or the information]. An offense is so included when:

(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or

(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or

(c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.

(5) Submission of Included Offense to Jury. The Court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 

SECTION 1.13. GENERAL DEFINITIONS 

In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is required:

(1) ‘‘statute’’ includes the Constitution and a local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of the State;

(2) ‘‘act’’ or ‘‘action’’ means a bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary;

(3) ‘‘voluntary’’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.01;

(4) ‘‘omission’’ means a failure to act;

(5) ‘‘conduct’’ means an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions;

(6) ‘‘actor’’ includes, where relevant, a person guilty of an omission;

(7) ‘‘acted’’ includes, where relevant, ‘‘omitted to act’’;

(8) ‘‘person,’’ ‘‘he’’ and ‘‘actor’’ include any natural person and, where relevant, a corporation or an unincorporated association;

(9) ‘‘element of an offense’’ means (i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstance or (iii) such a result of conduct as

(a) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense; or

(b) establishes the required kind of culpability; or

(c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; or

(d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or

(e) establishes jurisdiction or venue;

(10) ‘‘material element of an offense’’ means an element that does not relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter similarly unconnected with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct;

(11)  ‘‘purposely’’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms such as ‘‘with purpose,’’ ‘‘designed’’ or ‘‘with design’’ have the same meaning;

(12)  ‘‘intentionally’’ or ‘‘with intent’’ means purposely;

(13)  ‘‘knowingly’’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms such as ‘‘knowing’’ or ‘‘with knowledge’’ have the same meaning;

(14)  ‘‘recklessly’’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms such as ‘‘recklessness’’ or ‘‘with recklessness’’ have the same meaning;

(15)  ‘‘negligently’’ has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms such as ‘‘negligence’’ or ‘‘with negligence’’ have the same meaning;

(16) ‘‘reasonably believes’’ or ‘‘reasonable belief’’ designates a belief which the actor is not reckless or negligent in holding.

  

 SECTION 2.01. REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY ACT; OMISSION AS BASIS OF LIABILITY; POSSESSION AS AN ACT

(1)    A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.

(2)    The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:

(a)    a reflex or convulsion;

(b)    a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;

(c)    conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion;

(d)    a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.

(3)    Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless:

(a)    the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or

(b)    a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.

(4)    Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.

 


SECTION 2.02. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF CULPABILITY

(1)    Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.

(2)    Kinds of Culpability Defined.

(a)    Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:

(i)     if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and

(ii)    if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.

(b)    Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:

(i)     if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and

(ii)    if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.

(c)    Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.

(d)    Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.

(3)    Culpability Required Unless Otherwise Provided. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.

(4)    Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material Elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.

(5)    Substitutes for Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge. When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely.

(6)    Requirement of Purpose Satisfied if Purpose Is Conditional. When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

(7)    Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of High Probability. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.

(8)    Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.

(9)    Culpability as to Illegality of Conduct. Neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the Code so provides.

(10) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense. 

SECTION 2.03. CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONDUCT AND RESULT; DIVERGENCE BETWEEN RESULT DESIGNED OR CONTEMPLATED AND ACTUAL RESULT OR BETWEEN PROBABLE AND ACTUAL RESULT

 

(1)    Conduct is the cause of a result when:

(a)   it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and

(b)  the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining the offense.

(2)    When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless:

(a)   the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or

(b)   the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of his offense.

(3)    When recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he should be aware unless:

(a)    the actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or

(b)    the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of his offense.

(4)   When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor’s conduct. 

 SECTION 2.05. WHEN CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS ARE INAPPLICABLE TO VIOLATIONS AND TO OFFENSES DEFINED BY OTHER STATUTES; EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY IN REDUCING GRADE OF OFFENSE TO VIOLATION

 

(1)    The requirements of culpability prescribed by Sections 2.01 and 2.02 do not apply to:

(a)    offenses which constitute violations, unless the requirement involved is included in the definition of the offense or the Court determines that its application is consistent with effective enforcement of the law defining the offense; or

(b)    offenses defined by statutes other than the Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.

(2)    Notwithstanding any other provision of existing law and unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides:

(a)    when absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a violation; and

(b)    although absolute liability is imposed by law with respect to one or more of the material elements of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code, the culpable commission of the offense may be charged and proved, in which event negligence with respect to such elements constitutes sufficient culpability and the classification of the offense and the sentence that may be imposed therefor upon conviction are determined by Section 1.04 and Article 6 of the Code.

 

SECTION 2.06. LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER; COMPLICITY

 

(1)    A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.

(2)    A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:

(a)    acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or

(b)    he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the Code or by the law defining the offense; or

(c)    he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.

(3)    A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:

(a)    with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he

(i)     solicits such other person to commit it; or

(ii)    aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or

(b)    his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.

(4)    When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.

(5)    A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.

(6)    Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:

(a)    he is a victim of that offense; or

(b)    the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or

(c)    he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and

(i)     wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or

(ii)    gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.

(7)    An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. 

 SECTION 2.09. DURESS

(1)    It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.

(2)    The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged.

(3)    It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this Section. [The presumption that a woman acting in the presence of her husband is coerced is abolished.]

(4)    When the conduct of the actor would otherwise be justifiable under Section 3.02, this Section does not preclude such defense.

 

SECTION 3.02. JUSTIFICATION GENERALLY: CHOICE OF EVILS

(1)    Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:

(a)    the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and

(b)    neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and

(c)    a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

(2)    When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. 

SECTION 3.03. EXECUTION OF PUBLIC DUTY

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) of this Section, conduct is justifiable when it is required or authorized by:

(a) the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his duties; or

(b) the law governing the execution of legal process; or

(c) the judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal; or

(d) the law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war; or

(e) any other provision of law imposing a public duty.

(2) The other sections of this Article apply to:

(a) the use of force upon or toward the person of another for any of the purposes dealt with in such sections; and

(b) the use of deadly force for any purpose, unless the use of such force is otherwise expressly authorized by law or occurs in the lawful conduct of war.

(3) The justification afforded by Subsection (1) of this Section applies:

(a) when the actor believes his conduct to be required or authorized by the judgment or direction of a competent court or tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal process, notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction of the court or defect in the legal process; and

(b) when the actor believes his conduct to be required or authorized to assist a public officer in the performance of his duties, notwithstanding that the officer exceeded his legal authority. 


SECTION 3.04. USE OF FORCE IN SELF–PROTECTION

(1)    Use of Force Justifiable for Protection of the Person. Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.

(2)    Limitations on Justifying Necessity for Use of Force.

(a)    The use of force is not justifiable under this Section:

(i)     to resist an arrest that the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful; or

(ii)    to resist force used by the occupier or possessor of property or by another person on his behalf, where the actor knows that the person using the force is doing so under a claim of right to protect the property, except that this limitation shall not apply if:

(1)    the actor is a public officer acting in the performance of his duties or a person lawfully assisting him therein or a person making or assisting in a lawful arrest; or

(2)    the actor has been unlawfully dispossessed of the property and is making a re-entry or recaption justified by Section 3.06; or

(3)    the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm.

(b)    The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:

(i)     the actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter; or

(ii)    the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action that he has no duty to take, except that:

(1)    the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be; and

(2)    a public officer justified in using force in the performance of his duties or a person justified in using force in his assistance or a person justified in using force in making an arrest or preventing an escape is not obliged to desist from efforts to perform such duty, effect such arrest or prevent such escape because of resistance or threatened resistance by or on behalf of the person against whom such action is directed.

(c)    Except as required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Subsection, a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to be when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.

(3)    Use of Confinement as Protective Force. The justification afforded by this Section extends to the use of confinement as protective force only if the actor takes all reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows that he safely can, unless the person confined has been arrested on a charge of crime. 

SECTION 3.07. USE OF FORCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

 (1) Use of Force Justifiable to Effect an Arrest. Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest.

(2) Limitations on the Use of Force.

(a) The use of force is not justifiable under this Section unless:

(i) the actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or believes that it is otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested; and

(ii) when the arrest is made under a warrant, the warrant is valid or believed by the actor to be valid.

(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless:

(i) the arrest is for a felony; and

(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and

(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and

(iv) the actor believes that:

(1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or

(2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed.

(3) Use of Force to Prevent Escape from Custody. The use of force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody is justifiable when the force could justifiably have been employed to effect the arrest under which the person is in custody, except that a guard or other person authorized to act as a peace officer is justified in using any force, including deadly force, which he believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person from a jail, prison, or other institution for the detention of persons charged with or convicted of a crime.

(4) Use of Force by Private Person Assisting an Unlawful Arrest.

(a) A private person who is summoned by a peace officer to assist in effecting an unlawful arrest, is justified in using any force which he would be justified in using if the arrest were lawful, provided that he does not believe the arrest is unlawful.

(b) A private person who assists another private person in effecting an unlawful arrest, or who, not being summoned, assists a peace officer in effecting an unlawful arrest, is justified in using any force which he would be justified in using if the arrest were lawful, provided that (i) he believes the arrest is lawful, and (ii) the arrest would be lawful if the facts were as he believes them to be.

(5) Use of Force to Prevent Suicide or the Commission of a Crime.

(a) The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to prevent such other person from committing suicide, inflicting serious bodily harm upon himself, committing or consummating the commission of a crime involving or threatening bodily harm, damage to or loss of property or a breach of the peace, except that:

(i) any limitations imposed by the other provisions of this Article on the justifiable use of force in self-protection, for the protection of others, the protection of property, the effectuation of an arrest or the prevention of an escape from custody shall apply notwithstanding the criminality of the conduct against which such force is used; and

(ii) the use of deadly force is not in any event justifiable under this Subsection unless:

(1) the actor believes that there is a substantial risk that the person whom he seeks to prevent from committing a crime will cause death or serious bodily harm to another unless the commission or the consummation of the crime is prevented and that the use of such force presents no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; or

(2) the actor believes that the use of such force is necessary to suppress a riot or mutiny after the rioters or mutineers have been ordered to disperse and warned, in any particular manner that the law may require, that such force will be used if they do not obey.

(b) The justification afforded by this Subsection extends to the use of confinement as preventive force only if the actor takes all reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows that he safely can, unless the person confined has been arrested on a charge of crime. 

SECTION 3.09. MISTAKE OF LAW AS TO UNLAWFULNESS OF FORCE OR LEGALITY OF ARREST; RECKLESS OR NEGLIGENT USE OF OTHERWISE JUSTIFIABLE FORCE; RECKLESS OR NEGLIGENT INJURY OR RISK OF INJURY TO INNOCENT PERSONS

 (1)    The justification afforded by Sections 3.04 to 3.07, inclusive, is unavailable when:

(a)    the actor’s belief in the unlawfulness of the force or conduct against which he employs protective force or his belief in the lawfulness of an arrest which he endeavors to effect by force is erroneous; and

(b)    his error is due to ignorance or mistake as to the provisions of the Code, any other provision of the criminal law or the law governing the legality of an arrest or search.

(2)    When the actor believes that the use of force upon or toward the person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such belief would establish a justification under Sections 3.03 to 3.08 but the actor is reckless or negligent in having such belief or in acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief which is material to the justifiability of his use of force, the justification afforded by those Sections is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.

(3)    When the actor is justified under Sections 3.03 to 3.08 in using force upon or toward the person of another but he recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent persons, the justification afforded by those Sections is unavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards innocent persons. 

SECTION 5.01. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT

(1)    Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:

(a)    purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or

(b)    when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part; or

(c)    purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.

(2)    Conduct That May Be Held Substantial Step Under Subsection (1)(c). Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under Subsection (1)(c) of this Section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose. Without negativing the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law:

(a)    lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime;

(b)    enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission;

(c)    reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime;

(d)    unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed;

(e)    possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, that are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;

(f)     possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;

(g)    soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.

(3)    Conduct Designed to Aid Another in Commission of a Crime. A person who engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime that would establish his complicity under Section 2.06 if the crime were committed by such other person, is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by such other person.

(4)    Renunciation of Criminal Purpose. When the actor’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under Subsection (1)(b) or (1)(c) of this Section, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. The establishment of such defense does not, however, affect the liability of an accomplice who did not join in such abandonment or prevention. Within the meaning of this Article, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor’s course of conduct, that increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim. 

 
SECTION 5.02. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION

(1)    Definition of Solicitation. A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or which would establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission.

(2)    Uncommunicated Solicitation. It is immaterial under Subsection (1) of this Section that the actor fails to communicate with the person he solicits to commit a crime if his conduct was designed to effect such communication.

(3)    Renunciation of Criminal Purpose. It is an affirmative defense that the actor, after soliciting another person to commit a crime, persuaded him not to do so or otherwise prevented the commission of the crime, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

 

SECTION 5.03. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

(1)    Definition of Conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(a)    agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(b)    agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

(2)    Scope of Conspiratorial Relationship. If a person guilty of conspiracy, as defined by Subsection (1) of this Section, knows that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of conspiring with such other person or persons, whether or not he knows their identity, to commit such crime.

(3)    Conspiracy With Multiple Criminal Objectives. If a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.

(4)    Joinder and Venue in Conspiracy Prosecutions.

(a)    Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Subsection, two or more persons charged with criminal conspiracy may be prosecuted jointly if:

(i)     they are charged with conspiring with one another; or

(ii)    the conspiracies alleged, whether they have the same or different parties, are so related that they constitute different aspects of a scheme of organized criminal conduct.

(b)    In any joint prosecution under paragraph (a) of this Subsection:

(i)     no defendant shall be charged with a conspiracy in any county [parish or district] other than one in which he entered into such conspiracy or in which an overt act pursuant to such conspiracy was done by him or by a person with whom he conspired; and

(ii)    neither the liability of any defendant nor the admissibility against him of evidence of acts or declarations of another shall be enlarged by such joinder; and

(iii)   the Court shall order a severance or take a special verdict as to any defendant who so requests, if it deems it necessary or appropriate to promote the fair determination of his guilt or innocence, and shall take any other proper measures to protect the fairness of the trial.

(5)    Overt Act. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime other than a felony of the first or second degree, unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.

(6)    Renunciation of Criminal Purpose. It is an affirmative defense that the actor, after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

(7)    Duration of Conspiracy. For purposes of Section 1.06(4) [relating to periods of limitation for bringing prosecutions—ed.]:

(a)    conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct that terminates when the crime or crimes that are its object are committed or the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he conspired; and

(b)    such abandonment is presumed if neither the defendant nor anyone with whom he conspired does any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy during the applicable period of limitation; and

(c)    if an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to him only if and when he advises those with whom he conspired of his abandonment or he informs the law enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of his participation therein.

  

SECTION 5.05. GRADING OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPT, SOLICITATION AND CONSPIRACY; MITIGATION IN CASES OF LESSER DANGER; MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS BARRED

(1)    Grading. Except as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy. An attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree.

(2)    Mitigation. If the particular conduct charged to constitute a criminal attempt, solicitation or conspiracy is so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of a crime that neither such conduct nor the actor presents a public danger warranting the grading of such offense under this Section, the Court shall exercise its power under Section 6.12 to enter judgment and impose sentence for a crime of lower grade or degree or, in extreme cases, may dismiss the prosecution.

(3)    Multiple Convictions. A person may not be convicted of more than one offense defined by this Article for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime.

  

ARTICLE 210.0 HOMICIDE DEFINITIONS

In Articles 210–213, unless a different meaning plainly is required:

(1)    ‘‘human being’’ means a person who has been born and is alive;

(2)    ‘‘bodily injury’’ means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition;

(3)    ‘‘serious bodily injury’’ means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;

(4)    ‘‘deadly weapon’’ means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. 


SECTION 210.1. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE

(1) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being.

(2) Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide. 

 SECTION 210.2. MURDER

(1)    Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder when:

(a)    it is committed purposely or knowingly; or

(b)    it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.

(2)    Murder is a felony of the first degree [but a person convicted of murder may be sentenced to death, as provided in Section 210.6].

 

 SECTION 210.3. MANSLAUGHTER

(1)    Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:

(a)    it is committed recklessly; or

(b)    a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.

(2)    Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.

 SECTION 210.4. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

(1)    Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently.

(2)   Negligent homicide is a felony of the third degree.

 ARTICLE 213.0 SEXUAL OFFENSES DEFINITIONS

In this Article, unless a different meaning plainly is required:

(1)    the definitions given in Section 210.0 apply;

(2)     ‘‘Sexual intercourse’’ includes intercourse per os or per anum, with some penetration however slight; emission is not required;

(3)     ‘‘Deviate sexual intercourse’’ means sexual intercourse per os or per anum between human beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal.

 
SECTION 213.1. RAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES

(1)    Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if:

(a)    he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or

(b)    he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or

(c)    the female is unconscious; or

(d)    the female is less than 10 years old.

Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felony of the first degree.

(2)    Gross Sexual Imposition. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife commits a felony of the third degree if:

(a)    he compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution; or

(b)    he knows that she suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct; or

(c)    he knows that she is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon her or that she submits because she mistakenly supposes that he is her husband.

 

 SECTION 213.2. DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE BY FORCE OR IMPOSITION

 (1)    By Force or Its Equivalent. A person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person, or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, commits a felony of the second degree if:

(a)    he compels the other person to participate by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or

(b)    he has substantially impaired the other person’s power to appraise or control his conduct, by administering or employing without the knowledge of the other person drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or

(c)    the other person is unconscious; or

(d)    the other person is less than 10 years old.

(2)    By Other Imposition. A person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person, or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, commits a felony of the third degree if:

(a)    he compels the other person to participate by any threat that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; or

(b)    he knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct; or

(c)    he knows that the other person submits because he is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon him.

 
SECTION 213.3. CORRUPTION OF MINORS AND SEDUCTION

 (1) Offense Defined. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, or any person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse or causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, is guilty of an offense if:

(a) the other person is less than [16] years old and the actor is at least [four] years older than the other person; or

(b) the other person is less than 21 years old and the actor is his guardian or otherwise responsible for general supervision of his welfare; or

(c) the other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over him; or

(d) the other person is a female who is induced to participate by a promise of marriage which the actor does not mean to perform.

(2) Grading. An offense under paragraph (a) of Subsection (1) is a felony of the third degree. Otherwise an offense under this section is a misdemeanor.

SECTION 213.4. SEXUAL ASSAULT

 A person who has sexual contact with another not his spouse, or causes such other to have sexual conduct with him, is guilty of sexual assault, a misdemeanor, if:

(1)    he knows that the contact is offensive to the other person; or

(2)    he knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct; or

(3)    he knows that the other person is unaware that a sexual act is being committed; or

(4)    the other person is less than 10 years old; or

(5)    he has substantially impaired the other person’s power to appraise or control his or her conduct, by administering or employing without the other’s knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or

(6)    the other person is less than [16] years old and the actor is at least [four] years older than the other person; or

(7)    the other person is less than 21 years old and the actor is his guardian or otherwise responsible for general supervision of his welfare; or

(8)    the other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over him.

Sexual contact is any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. 

SECTION 213.5. INDECENT EXPOSURE

A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of himself or of any person other than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm. 

SECTION 213.6. PROVISIONS GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO ARTICLE 213

(1) Mistake as to Age. Whenever in this Article the criminality of conduct depends on a child’s being below the age of 10, it is no defense that the actor did not know the child’s age, or reasonably believed the child to be older than 10. When criminality depends on the child’s being below a critical age other than 10, it is a defense for the actor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.

(2) Spouse Relationships. Whenever in this Article the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse, the exclusion shall be deemed to extend to persons living as man and wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship. The exclusion shall be inoperative as respects spouses living apart under a decree of judicial separation. Where the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse or conduct by a woman, this shall not preclude conviction of a spouse or woman as accomplice in a sexual act which he or she causes another person, not within the exclusion, to perform.

(3) Sexually Promiscuous Complainants. It is a defense to prosecution under Section 213.3, and paragraphs (6), (7) and (8) of Section 213.4 for the actor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged victim had, prior to the time of the offense charged, engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with others.

(4) Prompt Complaint. No prosecution may be instituted or maintained under this Article unless the alleged offense was brought to the notice of public authority within [3] months of its occurrence or, where the alleged victim was less than [16] years old or otherwise incompetent to make complaint, within [3] months after a parent, guardian or other competent person specially interested in the victim learns of the offense.

(5) Testimony of Complainants. No person shall be convicted of any felony under this Article upon the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. Corroboration may be circumstantial. In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this Article, the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private. 

SECTION 242.3. HINDERING APPREHENSION OR PROSECUTION

A person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for crime, he:

(1)    harbors or conceals the other; or

(2)    provides or aids in providing a weapon, transportation, disguise or other means of avoiding apprehension or effecting escape; or

(3)    conceals or destroys evidence of the crime, or tampers with a witness, informant, document or other source of information, regardless of its admissibility in evidence; or

(4)    warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension, except that this paragraph does not apply to a warning given in connection with an effort to bring another into compliance with law; or

(5)    volunteers false information to a law enforcement officer.

The offense is a felony of the third degree if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against the person aided would constitute a felony of the first or second degree. Otherwise it is a misdemeanor. 


SECTION 250.2. DISORDERLY CONDUCT 

(1)    Offense Defined. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:

(a)    engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or

(b)    makes unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display, or addresses abusive language to any person present; or

(c)    creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.

‘‘Public’’ means affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, or any neighborhood.

(2)    Grading. An offense under this section is a petty misdemeanor if the actor’s purpose is to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he persists in disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist. Otherwise disorderly conduct is a violation.